Резюме

This analysis examines a judgment of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in case C-252/21 Meta Platforms and Others (Conditions Générales d’Utilisation d’un Réseau Social) v. Bundeskartellamt, interpreting the intersection of two of the most complex areas of European Union (EU) law – EU data protection law and competition law. The judgment answers the question of whether national competition authorities may assess compliance with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR or Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals about the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC) in proceedings to establish potential abuses of a dominant market position under Article 102 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). The CJEU clarifies the roles of competition protection authorities and data protection authorities (DPAs), regarding the one-stop shop mechanism introduced by the General Data Protection Regulation. Central to the judicial reasoning is the principle of sincere cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU), which requires Member States and the Union to cooperate in a spirit of mutual respect in carrying out tasks deriving from the Treaties. By examining the principles of EU law, this analysis of Case C-252/21 underscores the significance of the decision in determining institutional powers, coordinating powers, and the importance of judicial review for the practical application of EU law. In this analysis, I also argue that the case demonstrates how the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (Articles 5(3) and 5(4) TEU) help maintain the balance between the procedural autonomy of Member State institutions and the practical application of European Union law. I further argue that the decision serves as a genuine guidance on the application of the principle of sincere cooperation, outlining the steps involved in its application in specific cases where data protection and competition law intersect. The judgment also significantly impacts the European Data Protection Board’s Position Paper on the Interplay between Data Protection and Competition Law (adopted on January 16, 2025), highlighting the importance of cooperation between competition authorities and data protection supervisory bodies when tackling related issues. The analysis also examines the areas where the position paper and the decision overlap. This examination does not address the specific effects of consent under Article 6(1)(a) GDPR, such as whether a dominant position affects free consent as mentioned in the referenced case. It focuses solely on the institutional and procedural frameworks of regulatory authority and inter-agency cooperation within EU law.